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READING YOUR MIND AT THE BORDER: SEARCHING
MEMORIALIZED THOUGHTS AND MEMORIES ON YOUR
LAPTOP AND UNITED STATES v. ARNOLD
[T] he safety and happiness of society are the objects at which all
political institutions aim, and to which all such
institutions must be sacrificed.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In an ancient paradox, technology contemporaneously complicates
and simplifies our lives. 2 More attorneys, lay and business people, child
predators, and terrorists are using our technology and carrying innocu-
ous-and sometimes dangerous-information and materials across our
nation's borders every day.3 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
officers have longstanding authority to search without particularized suspi-
cion for contraband in closed containers and their contents crossing U.S.
borders.4 But today, many consider their laptops extensions of their own
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 307 (James Madison) (Charles Scribner ed.,
1864) (describing purposes of government created by Constitutional Convention).
Alexander Hamilton enlisted both James Madison and John Jay in an ultimately
successful attempt to persuade voters of New York to ratify the new Constitution of
the United States, drafted the same summer in Philadelphia. See id. at xxi (describ-
ing historical background of Madison's work).
2. See Richard Szafranski, The Economist Debate Series: Information Overload, The
Proposition's Opening Statement, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 26, 2008, available at http://
www.economist.com/debate/days/view/135 (arguing technology has made our
lives more complicated).
3. See Press Release, Travel Indus. Ass'n, Staying Wired on Vacation: Trav-
elers' Use of Technology on the Road (July 25, 2006), http://www.tia.org/press
media/pressrec.asp?Item=719 (describing travel habits and number of travelers).
4. See United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2008) (recount-
ing judiciary's acceptance of border searches without particularized suspicion),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009). Currently, CBP agents have statutory authority
to ensure compliance with federal law by examining "documents, books, pam-
phlets, and other printed material, as well as computers, disks, hard drives, and
other electronic or digital storage devices." See U.S. Customs and Border Prot.,
Policy Regarding Border Search of Information (2008), http://www.cbp.gov/link
handler/ cgov/ travel/ admissabili ty/search-authority.ctt/search-authority.pdf (es-
tablishing CBP procedures for border searches). CBP agents are authorized to
conduct searches pursuant to federal law. See 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2006) ("Any
officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or vehicle at any
place in the U.S. of within the customs waters or, as he may be authorized, within a
customs-enforcement area .... ."). In United States v. Ramsey, the Court invoked the
importance of border searches from our nation's founding and their distinct na-
ture from other searches. See 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (noting initial customs
statute passed in 1789 and precedent that has developed from it).
(541)
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minds and memories. 5 As a result, individuals may regard their laptops
and the information inside to be more private than their luggage, purses,
or wallets. 6 This subjective concern for private materials on one's laptop
must be weighed against the government's obligation to protect society
from, among other threats, child pornography and terrorism. 7 The gov-
ernment's interest in preventing the entry of prohibited persons and prop-
erty is at its zenith at international borders.8 Despite the government's
strong interests, the CBP established rules for border searches and has
limited the scope of searches to protect privacy interests while remaining a
proactive agency enforcing federal law.9
The prevailing case law supports the CBP's searches of tangible docu-
ments without particularized suspicion, and courts are adapting this prin-
ciple to digital files stored on personal laptops. 10 Generally, courts define
border searches as either routine or non-routine; non-routine searches re-
quire reasonable suspicion before the search is commenced, while routine
searches do not.'1 In 2004, the United States Supreme Court flatly re-
5. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1003 (C.D. Cal. 2006)
(recognizing new role laptops play at international border), rev'd, 533 F.3d 1003
(9th Cir. 2008).
6. See id. at 1003 (analyzing search of laptops as near equivalent of search of
person). The district court supported its holding upon the peculiar place laptops
hold in modern life. See id. (addressing importance of laptops for many interna-
tional travelers). The court suggested "some may value the sanctity of private
thoughts memorialized on a date storage device above physical privacy." Id. On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit criticized this premise. See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1007-08
(rejecting district court's intrusiveness analysis and holding that searches of objects
do not implicate same "dignity and privacy" concerns as "highly intrusive searches
of the person" (quoting United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152
(2004))).
7. See Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 472-73 (1979) (reaffirming right to
protect territorial integrity of United States). A sovereign nation is "entitled to
require that whoever seeks entry must establish the right to enter and to bring into
the country whatever he may carry." Id. (quoting Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620).
8. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (affirming that searches of persons and
property at sovereign nation's border are reasonable because they occur at physi-
cal border).
9. See Policy Regarding Border Search of Information, supra note 4, at 1
(describing procedures for border searches). For example, border searches must
be performed by a CBP agent or other authorized agent and, following detention
of materials to be searched, agents must protect the materials' contents. See id. at 3
(stating procedures for border searches). Specifically, agents must return the
materials and destroy all copies of them. See id. (same).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 507 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding
that search of defendant's laptop did not require reasonable suspicion). For a
discussion of case law relating to searches of laptops without particularized suspi-
cion, see infra notes 32-85 and accompanying text.
11. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) (re-
affirming that routine searches of persons and their effects do not require any
level of particularized suspicion). The Montoya de Hernandez Court held the deten-
tion of a traveler beyond the scope of a routine search and inspection requires
reasonable suspicion. See id. at 541 (holding that some searches of persons will
require particularized suspicion). Importantly, the Court emphasized what it did
[Vol. 54: p. 541
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jected a routineness analysis (i.e., an analysis to determine whether a
search can be considered "routine") for border searches of a vehicle and
instead relied on the established principles that permit border searches of
effects without particularized suspicion.' 2 In 2005, the Fourth Circuit sub-
sequently adapted this analysis to apply to laptops and permitted the
search of a defendant's computer and computer disks without particular-
ized suspicion.1 3 The Fourth Circuit did not characterize the search of
the laptop as routine or non-routine; rather, the court relied upon the
decreased expectation of privacy at international borders to conclude that
the search was reasonable.
14
Most recently, in 2008, the Ninth Circuit squarely addressed whether
any level of particularized suspicion is needed for searches of laptops in
United States v. Arnold.15 In reversing the district court's decision, the Ar-
nold court concluded that reasonable suspicion was not needed for border
searches of laptops. 16 Whether other circuits will permit suspicionless
searches of laptops at the border remains unclear. 17 Nevertheless, border
searches of laptops are an integral tool to enforce federal law and such
not hold. See id. at 541 n.4 (cautioning that Court did not hold what level of suspi-
cion is required for non-routine border searches). The Court declined to answer
what, if any, level of suspicion is needed for non-routine border searches such as
strip, body cavity, or involuntary x-ray searches. See id. (holding that there is differ-
ence between search that goes beyond scope of routine search and non-routine
searches). Thus, the Court enumerated at least three non-routine searches all in-
volving the search of a person. See id. (listing examples of non-routine border
searches).
12. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 156 (holding that disassembly of gas tank
does not require reasonable suspicion where procedure takes one to two hours
and does damage car). Particularized suspicion contains two elements. See United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (defining particularized suspicion). The
assessment must be based upon the totality of the circumstances of objective obser-
vation, and that assessment must arouse a reasonable suspicion that the particular
person being stopped has committed or is about to commit a crime. See id. (dis-
cussing particularized suspicion). Further, the Supreme Court declared
"[c]omplex balancing tests to determine what is a 'routine' search of a vehicle, as
opposed to a more 'intrusive' search of a person, have no place in border searches
of vehicles." Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (rejecting balancing test for border
search of vehicles). Replacing the routine search analysis, the Court reverted to a
judicial determination as to whether the search of property was destructive or con-
ducted in a particularly offensive manner to require particularized suspicion. See
id. at 155-56 (discussing possible border searches of property that may be
unreasonable).
13. See Ickes, 393 F.3d at 507-08 (permitting search of laptop without particu-
larized suspicion).
14. See id. at 506 (emphasizing decreased privacy expectations at international
border). For a further discussion of Ickes, see infra notes 91-107 and accompanying
text.
15. 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009). For a
further discussion of the level of suspicion needed to search a laptop at the inter-
national border, see infra notes 135-64 and accompanying text.
16. See id. at 1008 (holding that search of Arnold's laptop was reasonable).
17. See id. at 1010 (reversing district court's ruling); see also, e.g.,John W. Nel-
son, Border Confidential: Why Searches of Laptop Computers at the Border Should Require
2009] NOTE
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searches should be permitted absent particularized suspicion, given the
relatively low privacy interests in laptops as opposed to the privacy interests
involved in intrusive physical searches of persons.' 8
This Note discusses the Ninth Circuit's holding in United States v. Ar-
nold and the constitutionality of border searches of laptop computers. 19
Part II examines the Fourth Amendment's implication at the border and
also discusses the border search doctrine permitting some searches with-
out particularized suspicion. 20 In Part III, this Note explores lower court
rulings on searches of laptops. 21 Part IV of this Note concludes that bor-
der agents should be permitted to search laptops absent particularized sus-
picion because the nature of laptops does not compel the judiciary to treat
laptops differently than any other object crossing the international bor-
der.22 Finally, Part V addresses the significant underlying characteristics
of laptops, including the various kinds of information they may contain, as
well as steps that may be taken to protect travelers' privacy during suspi-
cionless searches. 23
Reasonable Suspicion, 31 AM.J. TRiAL ADvoc. 137, 144 (2007) (arguing national stan-
dard of reasonable suspicion should be imposed on border searches of laptops).
18. See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008 (declining to require reasonable suspicion to
justify border search of laptops and other personal electronic storage devices). For
further argument that laptop border searches should be permissible without par-
ticularized suspicion, see infra notes 165-92 and accompanying text.
19. See id. at 1005 (addressing constitutionality of border search of laptop);
United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2006) (suggesting, but declin-
ing to conclude, that border search of laptop is routine border search), cert. denied,
549 U.S. 1150 (2007); United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2006)
(declining to determine if search of computer disks is routine or non-routine
search because reasonable suspicion was present in any case); Ickes, 393 F.3d at 506
(affirming border search of laptop and characterizing search as routine); United
States v. Bunty, 617 F. Supp. 2d 359, 364-65 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (upholding border
search of laptop absent finding of reasonable suspicion).
20. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155-56 (2003) (con-
cluding government may inspect vehicle's fuel tank without suspicion). For fur-
ther discussion of lower court decisions on border searches in general, see infra
notes 32-85 and accompanying text.
21. See Ickes, 393 F.3d at 502 (addressing border search of laptop); United
States v. Arnold 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1000 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (requiring reasonable
suspicion to justify border search of defendant's laptop), rev'd, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th
Cir. 2008). For further discussion of recent court decisions on border searches of
laptops, see infra notes 91-164 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1009 (stating defendant failed to draw mean-
ingful differences between searches of laptops and luggage, for instance). For fur-
ther discussion arguing that laptops should be analyzed similar to other objects
like luggage, see infra notes 165-92 and accompanying text.
23. See Policy Regarding Border Search of Information, supra note 4, at 1
(describing procedures for border searches, which aim to protect traveler's per-
sonal information while still conducting effective border searches).
[Vol. 54: p. 541
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II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND BORDER SEARCHES: AN EXCEPTION TO
THE GENERAL WARRANT REQUIREMENT
A. Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Fourth Amendment protects the people's right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. 24 It generally requires that govern-
ment officials obtain a warrant before a lawful search can be conducted. 25
The Fourth Amendment will not apply, however, when the target of the
search does not possess a privacy interest that society would accept as rea-
sonable. 2 6 For example, the Supreme Court has held that items exposed
to public view are not shielded by a Fourth Amendment privacy interest,
and government action targeting such items will not implicate the Fourth
Amendment.2
7
In addition, some searches, where Fourth Amendment protections
are engaged, are permitted absent a warrant but require probable cause or
24. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1V (establishing protections from unreasonable
government searches and seizures). The Fourth Amendment sets forth:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, house, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
25. See id. (mandating government obtain warrants in order to conduct rea-
sonable search). Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable; however,
some searches can be conducted without a warrant. See Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (reasoning that "'[o] ver and again this Court has emphasized
that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial
processes,' . .. and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated ex-
ceptions" (quoting United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951))). Justice
Harlan's concurrence in Katz noted that the government will not be held to the
warrant requirement when the activity is in public view, and applied a two-part
subjective and objective privacy test to determine if a person has a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy at the location of the observed activity. See id. at 360-62
(Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing privacy with regard to Fourth Amendmentju-
risprudence). Justice Harlan declared:
[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expecta-
tion be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus a
man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but
objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain view" of
outsiders are not "protected" because no intention to keep them to him-
self has been exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the open
would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of
privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.
Id. at 361.
26. See, e.g., id. (observing Fourth Amendment "protects people, not places,"
but place must be one with privacy interest).
27. See id. (noting that objects and statements in public view are not
protected).
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a lower standard of suspicion. 28 This lower standard of suspicion is com-
monly referred to as "reasonable suspicion," and the scope of searches
justified by reasonable suspicion is generally less intrusive than searches
justified by probable cause. 29 Warrantless searches are typically justified
by policy arguments that the process and requirement of obtaining a war-
rant in every case would be impracticable or counterproductive to the gov-
ernment's interests. 30 Courts have recognized a variety of warrantless
searches, including the border search exception to the general warrant
requirement. 3
1
28. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1985) (permitting warrant-
less search of mobile home where government had probable cause to believe sus-
pect was delivering controlled substance from mobile home); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (holding search of vehicle without warrant, but
with probable cause that vehicle contained contraband, was not unreasonable). In
certain instances, the government is not required to develop probable cause to
believe a crime has or is being committed; rather, the lower standard of reasonable
suspicion is acceptable. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that
police officer may conduct pat-down search of suspect's outer clothing in some
circumstances). The Court declared:
Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reason-
ably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protec-
tion of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him.
Id. Police officers and other government officials have used the warrant excep-
tions created by the judiciary to largely promote the general welfare of society. See
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 34 GEO. L.J. ANN. REv. CRIM. PRO. 37, 37 (2005)
(enumerating warrantless searches and seizure currently recognized: investigatory
detentions of persons, investigatory detentions of property, warrantless arrests,
search incident to valid arrest, seizure of items in plain view, exigent circum-
stances, consent searches, vehicle searches, container searches, inventory searches,
border searches, searches at sea, administrative searches, special needs, and aban-
doned property).
29. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (exploring requirements for brief police deten-
tion and search of person). Reasonable suspicion is defined as "would the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate." Id.
Subjective good-faith belief on the part of the officer is not enough to meet reason-
able suspicion. See id. at 22 (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)) (describ-
ing limits of what constitutes reasonable suspicion).
30. See id. (recognizing that Teny searches are justified due to government's
general interest in crime prevention, as well as for detection and safety of police
officers).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985)
(explaining "[r]outine searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not sub-
ject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant");
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19 (1977) (holding first class mail cross-
ing U.S. border may be examined without warrant and on something less than
probable cause); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 285 (recognizing that not all searches and
[Vol. 54: p. 541
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol54/iss3/6
B. The History of the Border Search Exception to the General Fourth
Amendment Warrant Requirement
Beginning with this country's founding, Congress considered
searches and seizures at the nation's borders deserving of special status.3 2
The First United States Congress-the same Congress that proposed the
Bill of Rights-passed the nation's first customs statute.3 3 The customs
statute empowered customs officials to search ships for any goods subject
to duty, and it permitted those searches without subjecting them to Fourth
Amendment warrant requirements. 34 From that first statute, the wide-
seizures require probable cause or issuance of search warrant). The Supreme
Court noted:
Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary be-
cause of national self-protection reasonably requiring one entering the
country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as
effects which may be lawfully brought in. But those lawfully within the
country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage
without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent offi-
cial, authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles
are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.
Carroll, 267 U.S. 285. For an enumeration of warrantless search and seizures ex-
ceptions, see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
32. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616-17 (describing "plenary customs power" estab-
lished in 1789, which treated searches at borders apart from Fourth Amendment
protections). Importantly, the Ramsey Court placed great weight on the fact that
the same congress that passed the customs statute also proposed the Bill of Rights,
which includes the Fourth Amendment. See id. (noting historical background of
first customs statute). The Court embraced an earlier court's analysis, stating, "it is
clear that the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this
kind as 'unreasonable,' and they are not embraced within the prohibition of the
amendment." Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886)); see
also United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) (reiterating that
searches at border are reasonable "simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at
the border"); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153-54 (recognizing distinction between border
searches and searches within interior of country).
33. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616-17 (providing historical pedigree of border
search doctrine). "This acknowledgement of plenary customs power was differen-
tiated from the more limited power to enter and search any particular dwelling-
house, store, building, or other place where a warrant upon cause to suspect was
required." Id.
34. See id. at 616 (citing nation's first custom's statute). Section 24 of 1 STAT.
29, the customs statute, provided in relevant portions:
[E]very collector, naval officer and surveyor, or other person specially
appointed by either of them for that purpose, shall have full power and
authority, to enter any ship or vessel, in which they shall have reason to
suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be con-
cealed; and therein to search for, seize, and secure any such goods, wares
or merchandise; and if they shall have cause to suspect a concealment
thereof, in any particular dwelling-house, store, building, or other place,
they or either of them shall, upon application on oath or affirmation to
any justice of the peace, be entitled to a warrant to enter such house,
store, or other place (in the day time only) and there to search for such
goods, and if any shall be found, to seize and secure the same for trial
Id. at 616 n.12 (citing Act of July 31, 1789, c. 5, 1 STAT. 29).
2009] NOTE
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spread authority to search and seize persons and property entering the
United States is largely premised on the government's strong interest in
enforcing its laws at the border. 35 By logical and practical extension, the
authority of border agents to search persons and property encompasses
international airports because they are de facto international borders. 36
Despite the broad power of border agents to conduct border
searches, the Supreme Court has limited the scope of searches depending
upon the nature of the searches' target.3 7 Border searches are roughly
35. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (noting reasons why searches and
seizures at border are not "unreasonable" searches, thus Fourth Amendment gen-
eral warrant requirement does not apply). Chief Justice Rehnquist argued: "It is
axiomatic that the United States, as sovereign, has the inherent authority to pro-
tect, and a paramount interest in protecting, its territorial integrity." Id. at 153.
Further, the Court observed the government's interest in protecting its citizens is
at its "zenith at the international border." See id. at 152 (discussing government's
need to protect citizens); see also Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538-39 (noting
"broad powers [of custom officials] have been necessary to prevent smuggling and
to prevent prohibited articles from entry"); Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616-17 (enumerat-
ing "long-standing right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examin-
ing persons and property crossing into this country"); United States v. Arnold, 533
F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2008) (observing strong government interest to search
persons and property at border), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009); United States
v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506 (4th Cir. 2005) ("The government has an overriding
interest in securing the safety of its citizens and to do this it must seek to prevent
'the introduction of contraband into this county."' (quoting Montoya de Hernandez,
473 U.S. at 537)); United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1002 (C.D. Cal.
2006) (conceding that government's interest at border is at its zenith, and lessened
expectation of privacy exists at border), rev'd, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008). The
rationale of the border search doctrine applies not only to individuals and prop-
erty entering the country, but also to individuals and their effects leaving the
United States. See, e.g., United States v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1999) (con-
cluding border search exception applies to departing travelers and their property);
see also Christine A. Coletta, Laptop Searches at the United States Borders and the Border
Search Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 48 B.C. L. REv. 971, 978-79 (2007) (noting
border search exception applies to entering and exiting individuals).
36. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (stating "a
search of the passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St. Louis airport
after a non-stop flight from Mexico City would clearly be the functional equivalent
of a border search"); United States v.Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1290 (7th Cir. 1993)
(holding that where individual flies non-stop into United States, international air-
port is functional equivalent of international border); see also United States v.
Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 364-65 (3d Cir. 1985) (establishing that border search is
permissible where individual and property landed in Pittsburgh after stops in
other major United States airports, there was no evidence property was materially
altered within U.S. borders, and Pittsburgh was earliest practical location to search
individual and property). But see generally United States v. Cotterman, No. CR 07-
1207-TUC-RCC, 2009 WL 465028 (D. Ariz. Feb. 24, 2009) (granting motion to sup-
press where search occurred 170 miles from international border and at least forty-
eight hours from initial stop, thereby requiring reasonable suspicion under ex-
tended border search doctrine).
37. See, e.g., Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152-54 (addressing, but not resolving,
issue of under what circumstances border search of property will be unreasona-
ble); Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 (holding that reasonable suspicion is
required where detention of individual is beyond scope of routine search).
[Vol. 54: p. 541
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divided into two major categories: searches of persons and searches of
property. 38 Searches of persons are analyzed under an intrusiveness anal-
ysis, with an aim to determine whether the search is routine or non-rou-
tine.39 An intrusiveness analysis weighs the search's intrusiveness against
the suspicion justifying the search. 40 When there is a high level of suspi-
cion amounting to reasonable suspicion, body cavity searches are permissi-
ble.4 1 Without particularized suspicion, only less intrusive and limited
searches, such as pat-downs, are permitted. 42 As to searches of objects, the
Court in United States v. Flores-Montano4 3 appeared to declare that these
searches are always treated as routine, thereby not requiring particularized
suspicion, with two exceptions for particularly offensive searches and
searches that are destructive to the property searched. 44
Because the district court in Arnold and several commentators have
analyzed searches of laptops as though they are searches of persons, a his-
tory of border searches of persons is relevant. 45 Border searches of per-
sons can vary in scope, and the level of intrusiveness depends directly
38. See Rasha Alzahabi, Should You Leave Your Laptop at Home When Traveling
Abroad?: The Fourth Amendment and Border Searches of Laptop Computers, 41 IND. L.
REV. 161, 167 (2008) (noting that case law provides less protection from searches
of property than searches of persons); Lindsay E. Harrell, Down to the Last JPEG:
Addressing the Constitutionality of Suspicionless Border Searches of Computers and One
Court's Pioneering Approach in United States v. Arnold, 37 Sw. U. L. REv. 205, 210-11
(2008) (describing jurisprudence distinguishing between searches of persons and
objects); Investigation and Police Practice, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 3, 105-
06 (2006) (discussing border searches of persons and their effects).
39. See Hlores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (rejecting extension of routine/non-
routine balancing test to vehicles); Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008 (stating intrusiveness
analysis is inappropriate where border search involves property); WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
5 SEARCHES & SEIzuRE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.5(f) (2008)
(discussing routine/non-routine framework with regard to property). The com-
mentator asked:
[M]ay it now be said (as the government had argued in Molina-[Tarazon])
that a search of inanimate objects at the border is always routine and thus
never requires individualized suspicion? While the Court's broadly state
opening salvo in Flores-Montano, quoted above, might be read as answer-
ing that question in the affirmative, it is important to note that the Court
actually did not go that far, acknowledging in conclusion that "it may be
true that some searches of property are so destructive as to require a dif-
ferent result."
LAFAVE, supra, § 10.5(f) (footnote omitted).
40. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (discussing other methods of analyzing
border searches).
41. See, e.g., Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 (discussing level of suspi-
cion required for body cavity search).
42. See id. at 54142 (holding reasonable suspicion is appropriate justification
for search conducted).
43. 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
44. See id. at 152, 155-56 (stating that balancing test to determine what consti-
tutes "routine" search is inappropriate for border searches of vehicles, but noting
two examples where border search of property may be unreasonable).
45. See United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1003-04 (C.D. Cal. 2006)
(holding search of laptop implicates privacy and dignity interest of person), rev'd,
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upon the level of suspicion, if any, that the government observes at the
border. 46 Searches of persons are roughly divided into two main kinds of
searches: routine and non-routine.4 7 The Supreme Court has not ex-
pressly defined what constitutes a non-routine search (as opposed to a rou-
tine border search) .48 Further, the Court has failed to articulate what
level of suspicion is needed for non-routine searches of persons. 49 But in
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,50 the Supreme Court identified three
specific examples of a non-routine search: searches of a body cavity, strip
searches, and involuntary x-ray searches of persons.
5 1
The Montoya de Hernandez Court used the term "routine" to describe
certain border searches that it determined could be conducted without
reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or a warrant. 52 In Montoya de Her-
533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008); see also, e.g., Coletta, supra note 35, at 999 (arguing
laptop search is deeply intrusive and should require at least reasonable suspicion).
46. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540-41 (noting intrusiveness of
search can vary depending on level of suspicion observed).
47. See Elores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (refining use of routine and non-rou-
tine border searches with regard to search of vehicle); Montoya de Hernandez, 473
U.S. at 541 (describing border searches as routine and non-routine).
48. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 n.4 (noting non-comprehensive
list of non-routine searches).
49. See id. (declining to declare level of suspicion needed for non-routine bor-
der search). The Court stated, "we suggest no view on what level of suspicion, if
any, is required for non-routine border searches such as strip, body cavity, or invol-
untary x-ray searches." Id.; see also Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (reiterating lack
of clarity regarding what level of suspicion is needed for non-routine searches);
Kelly A. Gilmore, Preserving the Border Search Doctrine in a Digital World: Reproducing
Electronic Evidence at the Border, 72 BROOK. L. REv. 759, 768 (2007) (addressing non-
routine border searches and possibility that reasonable suspicion be required);
Harrell, supra note 38, at 211 (discussing level of suspicion needed for non-routine
searches and routine searches conducted beyond scope of routine search).
50. 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
51. See id. at 541 n.4 (providing three examples of non-routine searches).
ChiefJustice Rehnquist continued: "we suggest no view on what level of suspicion,
if any, is required for non-routine border searches such as strip, body cavity, or
involuntary x-ray searches." Id.
52. See id. at 54041 (determining which standard should be used during bor-
der searches). The Court used the term "routine" four times. See id. (using "rou-
tine" throughout opinion). "Since the founding of our Republic, Congress has
granted the Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at
the border, without probable cause or a warrant, in order to regulate the collec-
tion of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this country." Id.
at 537 (emphasis added). "Routine searches of the persons and effects of entrants
are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or
warrant, and first-class mail may be opened without a warrant on less than proba-
ble cause ...." Id. at 538 (emphasis added). "We have not previously decided
what level of suspicion would justify a seizure of an incoming traveler for purposes
other than a routine border search." Id. at 540 (emphasis added). And, also in the
court's holding: "We hold that the detention of a traveler at the border, beyond
the scope of a routine customs search and inspection, is justified at its inception if
customs agents, considering all the facts surrounding the traveler and her trip,
reasonably suspect that the traveler is smuggling contraband. ... " Id. at 541 (em-
phasis added). Other courts have addressed the use of the word "routine." See
[Vol. 54: p. 541
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nandez, a customs official suspected the defendant was attempting to enter
the United States with narcotics concealed in her alimentary canal.5 3 Con-
sequently, custom officials observed the defendant for the next sixteen
hours, ready to search her stool for evidence of smuggling drugs. 54 Chief
Justice Rehnquist concluded that the defendant's detention exceeded a
routine search and seizure, and thus reasonable suspicion was needed to
justify the detention. 55 The Court held that reasonable suspicion is re-
Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (criticizing lower court's use of descriptive term
"routine" in Montoya de Hernandez opinion to "[fashion] a new balancing test, and
[extend] it to search of vehicles"). The Court noted "the reasons that might sup-
port a requirement of some level of suspicion in the case of highly intrusive
searches of the person-dignity and privacy interest of the person being
searched-simply do not carry over to vehicles." Id.
53. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 534 (recounting factors that led to
agent suspecting defendant was "balloon swallower," including: amount of cash
she possessed, fact she did not know anyone in United States, lack of hotel accom-
modations, only one pair of shoes, cold weather apparel, her entry into United
States from direct flight departing Bogota, Columbia, known source of illegal nar-
cotics entering United States).
54. See id. at 534-36 (relating background facts of case). Agents conducted a
pat-down and strip search, which resulted in the discovery of a firmness in her
abdomen and paper towels lining her crotch area. See id. at 534 (noting type and
scope of search conducted). Agents held the defendant in an observation room
following her initial detention. See id. at 534-36 (discussing detention of defen-
dant). Agents allowed the defendant to choose one of three options: return to
Columbia, consent to an x-ray that could help agents determine if she hid narcot-
ics in her alimentary canal, or produce a monitored bowel movement. See id. (not-
ing facts of case). The defendant chose to return to Columbia, but she remained
in detention until the next available flight. See id. (addressing facts of case). Ulti-
mately, the defendant waited sixteen hours, "exhibit[ing] symptoms of discomfort
consistent with heroic efforts to resist the usual calls of nature." See id. (stating
unusual circumstances of defendant's detention) (internal quotations omitted).
At the conclusion of her detention, agents received authority to have the defen-
dant examined by a doctor, who subsequently discovered narcotics in her alimen-
tary canal. See id. (describing government's search). The defendant was
subsequently placed under arrest. See id. (noting defendant's arrest).
55. See id. at 542 (holding that search needed to be justified by reasonable
suspicion). ChiefJustice Rehnquist determined, "[h]ere, respondent was detained
incommunicado for almost [sixteen] hours before inspectors sought a warrant; the
warrant then took a number of hours to procure, through no apparent fault of the
inspectors. This length of time undoubtedly exceeds any other detention we have
approved under reasonable suspicion." Id. The opinion also concluded reasona-
ble suspicion was present in the instant matter:
The facts, and their rational inferences, known to customs inspectors in
this case clearly supported a reasonable suspicion that respondent was an
alimentary canal smuggler. We need not belabor the facts, including re-
spondent's implausible story, that supported this suspicion. The trained
customs inspectors had encountered many alimentary canal smugglers
and certainly had more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion
or hunch, that respondent was smuggling narcotics in her alimentary
canal.
Id. The Court based its reasonable suspicion requirement upon, inter alia, the gov-
emnment's commanding interest to protect its territorial borders. See id. at 53940
(holding reasonable suspicion is required, but suggesting that if search did not
occur at international border then higher level of suspicion may be required).
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quired to search an individual's alimentary canal because "[t] he interests
in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects for-
bid any such intrusion [beyond the body's surface] on the mere chance
that desired evidence might be obtained. "56 Moreover, the Court af-
firmed the authority of customs officials to conduct routine searches of
persons absent reasonable suspicion or probable cause.5 7  Routine
searches are less likely to extensively invade an individual's privacy, and
although it is unclear what precisely constitutes a routine search, searches
of body cavities, strip searches, and involuntary x-rays do not appear to
qualify.58 Accordingly, travelers must accept and anticipate many routine
searches at the international border.
5 9
56. See id. at 540 n.3 (discussing level of suspicion required where traveler's
alimentary canal was searched (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769
(1966))). Justice Brennan wrote a scathing dissent, cautioning that the majority's
holding condoned "[i]ndefinite involuntary incommunicado detentions," which
he believed was the "hallmark of a police state." See id. at 550 (Brennan,J., dissent-
ing) (arguing instant search is not permissible merely with reasonable suspicion).
Justice Brennan contended the government may "no more confine a person at the
border under such circumstances for purposes of criminal investigation than they
may within the interior of the country." See id. (suggesting border search excep-
tion should be disregarded under instant circumstances).
57. See id. at 538 (majority opinion) (recognizing govemment's power to con-
duct routine border searches). The Court noted:
Consistently, therefore, with Congress' power to protect the Nation by
stopping and examining persons entering this country, the Fourth
Amendment's balance of reasonableness is qualitatively different at the
international border than in the interior. Routine searches of the persons
and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of reasonable
suspicion, probable cause, or warrant, and first-class mail may be opened
without a warrant on less than probable cause.
Id.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 511-12 (1st Cir. 1988) (sug-
gesting six factors to determine whether search was non-routine). The First Cir-
cuit enumerated the following factors for defining a search: (1) whether the search
required the suspect to disrobe or expose any intimate body parts; (2) whether
physical contact was made with the suspect during the search; (3) whether force
was used; (4) "whether the type of search expose [d] the suspect to pain or danger;
(5) the overall manner in which the search [was] conducted; and (6) whether the
suspect's reasonable expectations of privacy, if any, [were] abrogated by the
search[.]" See id. (concluding strip searches and body cavity searches are generally
considered non-routine border searches) (footnotes and citations omitted).
59. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 539-40 (stating that, at border, gov-
ernment's interests are heightened and individuals have less expectation of pri-
vacy); Harrell, supra note 38, at 209-10 (suggesting near certainty that travelers
expect some searches at borders and international airports). But see Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 515 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976)) ("[The defendant] was approached in a
major international airport where, due in part to extensive antihijacking surveil-
lance and equipment, reasonable privacy expectations are of significantly lesser
magnitude, certainly no greater than the reasonable privacy expectations of trav-
elers in automobiles.").
[Vol. 54: p. 541
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Apart from border searches of persons, CBP agents are also permitted
to search an individual's effects upon crossing the international border.
60
The modern customs statute permits a customs official to board and in-
spect any vessel or vehicle, to ensure compliance with federal law. 6 1 Most
courts, in light of the government's strong interests at the international
border, expansively interpret border search authorization statutes.62 For
example, following Chief Justice Rehnquist's Montoya de Hernandez opin-
ion, some courts adopted a routineness analysis for border searches of
property to determine what level of suspicion is required to justify a partic-
ular search of an object. 63
60. See generally United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724, 738 (5th Cir. 1986)
(holding search of defendant's baggage permissible simply because search oc-
curred at border). In Fortna, border agents searched the defendant and photo-
copied documents he carried. See id. at 738 (describing search). Because the
defendant had no expectation of privacy that border agents would not inspect the
documents, the court concluded the photocopying was permissible. See id. (noting
defendant in international airport lacked expectation of privacy that objects car-
ried would remain hidden). Photocopying "merely memorialized the agents' ob-
servations and provided a means to verify any subsequent recounting of them." Id.
(citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)).
61. See 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2000) (granting power to border agents to con-
duct border searches). Section 1581 (a) states in relevant part:
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or
vehicle at any place in the United States or within the customs waters or,
as he may be authorized... and examine the manifest and other docu-
ments and papers and examine, inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle
and every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board
Id. Other government officials are authorized by statute to conduct border
searches. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(c) (recognizing that immigration officials may con-
duct warrantless searches); 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (stating U.S. Coast Guard is permit-
ted to inspect vessels on high seas or in U.S. territorial waters); 19 U.S.C. § 482
(recognizing that authorized persons may search vehicles suspected of illegally
bringing merchandise into country). Custom officials have express statutory au-
thorization to search travelers' baggage. See 19 U.S.C. § 1496 ("The appropriate
customs officer may cause an examination to be made of the baggage of any per-
son arriving in the United States in order to ascertain what articles are contained
therein and whether subject to duty, free of duty, or prohibited notwithstanding a
declaration and entry therefor has been made."); see also 19 C.F.R. § 162.5 (2007)
("A customs officer may stop any vehicle and board any aircraft arriving in the
United States from a foreign country for the purpose of examining the manifest
and other documents and papers and examining, inspecting, and searching the
vehicle or aircraft."); 19 C.F.R. § 162.6 ("All persons, baggage, and merchandise
arriving in the Customs territory of the United States from places outside thereof
are liable to inspection and search by a Customs officer.").
62. See United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 505 (4th Cir. 2005) (interpreting
customs officials' authority under customs statute to encompass searches of per-
sons). "The realization that important national security interest are at stake 'has
resulted in courts giving the broadest interpretation compatible with our constitu-
tional principles in construing the statutory powers of customs officials."' Id.
(quoting United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661, 666 (9th Cir. 1976)).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d 709, 717 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding reasonable suspicion is required for inspection of fuel due to de-
gree of intrusiveness), abrogated by United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149
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In 2004, however, in another Rehnquist opinion, the Court refined
and clarified the border search exception for searches of property in
United States v. Flores-Montano.64 In Flores-Montano, the defendant at-
tempted to enter the United States in southern California in his station
wagon. 65 Upon inspection at the border, an agent tapped on the vehicle's
gas tank and stated that he believed the tank sounded "solid."6 6 The
agent requested assistance from an authorized mechanic to disassemble,
inspect, and reassemble the vehicle's gas tank. 67 After disassembly, the
mechanic discovered marijuana hidden in the gas tank. 68 The defendant
moved to suppress evidence from the search, which the district court
(2004); United States v. Roberts, 274 F.3d 1007, 1014 (5th Cir. 2001) (using rou-
tineness analysis where agents searched defendant's computer disks, which ulti-
mately contained child pornography). But see United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110,
123 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding search of passenger's effects and property was per
se routine and not conducted in offensive manner); United States v. Cortez-Rocha,
394 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2005) (declining to extend routineness analysis to
searches of property and concluding search did not require reasonable suspicion
or probable cause where agents cut open spare tire in defendant's trunk to search
for contraband); United States v. Bunty, 617 F. Supp. 2d 359, 364-65 (E.D. Pa.
2008) (accepting reasonableness of search of computer data where agents lacked
reasonable suspicion).
64. See Fores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (addressing standards for border search
of vehicle's fuel tank); Gilmore, supra note 49, at 769 (discussing Court's rejection
of complex balancing tests used in context of at least vehicle border searches);
LAFAVE, supra note 39, §10.5(f) (addressing Court's seemingly bright-line rule that
all border searches of property are routine, thus reasonable suspicion or probable
cause was not required for searches' justification).
65. See lores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 150-51 (recounting facts of case). The de-
fendant approached the Otay Mesa Port of Entry in southern California where an
agent inspected the defendant's vehicle. See id. at 150 (discussing facts of case).
For unknown reasons, the agent directed the defendant and his vehicle for secon-
dary inspections. See id. (noting factual information concerning initial stop at bor-
der). At the secondary inspection, the agent concluded the fuel tank was "solid"
upon tapping the outer casing of the tank. See id. at 151 (describing border
search).
66. See id. (stating facts concerning secondary search of vehicle). The secon-
dary inspection indicated a possible concealment of narcotics in the fuel tank. See
id. (noting results of subsequent search). The agent then requested a mechanic,
who arrived in approximately twenty to thirty minutes, to disassemble the vehicle's
gas tank. See id. (describing agent's request for expert).
67. See id. at 150-51 (describing agent's request of authorized mechanic's
assistance).
68. See id. at 151 (noting evidence discovered subsequent to search). The au-
thorized mechanic utilized a hydraulic lift to detach the vehicle from its gas tank,
disconnected several hoses, and discovered an access panel on the top of the tank.
See id. (describing techniques used to disassemble gas tank). Beneath the access
panel, the mechanic discovered thirty-seven kilograms of marijuana bricks. See id.
(summarizing evidence discovered in defendant's vehicle's gas tank). The Court
noted the authorized mechanic arrived after approximately twenty to thirty min-
utes and the mechanic spent fifteen to twenty-five minutes disassembling and in-
specting the fuel tank, for a total of thirty-five to fifty-five minutes. See id.
(recounting total time spent searching defendant's vehicle).
[Vol. 54: p. 541
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granted. 69 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision to grant
the defendant's motion to suppress. 70 The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari and the defendant argued: (1) he had a privacy interest in his vehi-
cle's fuel tank that was violated by the search; and (2) the Fourth
Amendment protects property as well as personal privacy and thus the
search was a significant deprivation of his property interest.
71
In rejecting the defendant's arguments, the Court emphasized that
the search in question was a border search, citing the government's long-
standing right to protect its residents from dangerous persons and their
effects. 7 2 According to the Court, the government's interest is not easily
counterbalanced by an individual's right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.7 3 Further, the
Court noted a person has no more privacy interest in a vehicle's gas tank
than in a valid search of a vehicle's passenger compartment, and the total
search of the vehicle's fuel tank was quick and did not destroy the safety or
operation of the vehicle.7 4 Specifically, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited two
69. See id. (discussing procedural history of case).
70. See id. (discussing procedural history of case).
71. See id. at 154-55 (noting defendant's arguments on appeal). The defen-
dant contended he had an expectation of privacy in his vehicle's fuel tank, unlike
his vehicle's passenger compartment. See id. at 154 (arguing privacy interests in
defendant's vehicle are not outweighed by government interests when searched
pursuant to border search exception). The defendant also alleged the disassembly
of his vehicle's fuel tank was a significant deprivation of his property interest. See
id. (arguing disassembly of defendant's gas tank is unreasonable because search
could damage the vehicle). Specifically, the defendant asserted the standard pro-
cedure of removing a vehicle's fuel tank may damage the vehicle. See id. at 154-55
(arguing government's search could damage vehicle's gas tank).
72. See id. at 152 (observing strong governmental interest in preventing un-
wanted persons and contraband from entering nation).
73. See id. at 152-53 (emphasizing necessary national security function of bor-
der searches). Although the Court continued to uphold the government's right to
search persons and property entering the United States, it also rejected the rou-
tineness balancing test formulated by some lower courts. See id. at 152 (dismissing
creation of balancing test from use of descriptive word "routine"). In particular,
the Court concluded, "[c]omplex balancing tests to determine what is a 'routine'
search of a vehicle, as opposed to a more 'intrusive' search of a person, have no
place in border searches of vehicles." Id.; accord United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d
1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding intrusiveness analysis is not warranted for
property searches because property "does not implicate same 'dignity and privacy
concerns' as 'highly intrusive searches of the person"' (quoting Flores-Montano, 541
U.S. at 152)), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009).
74. See Flares-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154-56 (noting manner in which agents
searched gas tank did not have high risk of substantially damaging property). The
Court briefly noted that "[w]hile the interference with a motorist's possessory in-
terest is not insignificant when the Government removes, disassembles, and reas-
sembles his gas tank, it nevertheless is justified by the Government's paramount
interest in protecting the border." Id. at 155; see also Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008 (rec-
ognizing Flares-Montano Court's interpretation that intrusiveness or routineness
balancing tests are inapplicable in circumstances where property has been sub-
jected to suspicionless border search).
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examples where a border search of property will be unreasonable. 75 First,
a border search of property may be unreasonable if it is conducted in a
particularly offensive manner. 76 Nonetheless, the Court declined to de-
fine what a particularly offensive border search would look like. 77 Second,
the Court declared that a border search of property may be unreasonable
if it causes serious damage to, or destruction of, the property.7 8 The
Court concluded that the suspicionless search of the fuel tank was within
the scope of the border search exception to the general warrant require-
ment, and failed to meet the offensive or destructive exceptions it had
carved out, which would have required reasonable suspicion.
79
Accordingly, the target of the border search will determine how a
court will analyze the case, and the characterization of the target as either
property or person is crucial to the defendant.80 Searches of property are
reasonable with two identified-though generally undefined-excep-
tions.8 1 Border searches of persons, on the other hand, are analyzed
under an intrusiveness analysis where highly intrusive body searches impli-
cate Fourth Amendment privacy concerns and require perhaps at least
reasonable suspicion, while less intrusive searches of persons will not re-
quire any particularized suspicion.82 Courts and commentators do not
agree on the specific analysis that should be applied to border searches of
75. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155-56 (addressing defendant's arguments
on appeal); see also United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618 n.13 (1977) (discuss-
ing-but declining to comment on-circumstances when border search is particu-
larly offensive and therefore unreasonable).
76. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155 n.2 (addressing offensive searches
(quoting Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 n.13)).
77. See id. at 155-56 (describing circumstances where border search of prop-
erty may be unreasonable without justification by some level of particularized sus-
picion). Importantly, the Court addressed the possibility that a border search of
property could be unreasonable. See id. (noting border searches of property are
limited). The Court declined to address "whether, and what circumstances, a bor-
der search might be deemed 'unreasonable' because of the particularly offensive
manner in which it is carried out." Id. at 155 n.2 (citing Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618
n.13).
78. See id. at 155-56 (concluding border search could be unreasonable if
search causes serious damage to property). The Court also stated that a border
search of property may be unreasonable if the search is "so destructive," but the
disassembly of the vehicle's fuel tank was not considered "so destructive" as to
render the search unreasonable. See id. at 156 (concluding destructive exception
was not applicable to instant search).
79. See id. at 155-56 (noting search was reasonable).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008) (re-
jecting district court's characterization of laptop search as akin to search of person,
and concluding laptop was searchable absent particularized suspicion), cert. denied
129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009).
81. See, e.g., Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155-56 (describing possible analyses for
border searches of property).
82. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985)
(holding reasonable suspicion required for detention of person at border is "be-
yond the scope of a routine customs search and inspection").
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laptops. 8 3 Some prefer to analyze searches of laptops under the intrusive-
ness analysis typically applied to searches of persons.8 4 Others believe
laptops should be subject to the same analysis applied to searches of
property.8 5
III. THE CREATION OF NEW PRIVACY CONCERNS WITH THE ADVENT OF
WIDESPREAD USE OF LAPTOPS IN INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL
In recent years, an increasing number of international travelers carry
laptops and other portable electronic devices containing various types of
information in electronic form.8 6 Ultimately, some of those laptop com-
puters crossing the U.S. border contain contraband materials, such as
child pornography.8 7 Some defendants prosecuted for federal crimes re-
lated to child pornography have argued that a search of a laptop must be
analyzed as though the search were an intrusive search of a person.8 8 A
number of courts and commentators have grappled with this contention,
suggesting reasonable suspicion is needed to justify such searches, while
others argue no particularized suspicion is needed to justify the
searches.8 9 Thus, the fundamental aspects of these defendants' argu-
ments remain a battle not yet resolved by our judiciary.9 0
A. Recent Decisions Involving Laptops and the Border Search Doctrine
1. The Fourth Circuit and United States v. Ickes
In 2000, John Woodward Ickes, Jr. attempted to enter the United
States near Detroit, Michigan with child pornography hidden on a com-
83. See generally Alzahabi, supra note 38, at 170-76 (analyzing different ap-
proaches taken by various circuits). But see Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1003 (resolving
potential circuit split between Fourth and Ninth Circuits).
84. See, e.g., id. (likening, for analytical purpose, search of person and search
of laptop to use balancing test to determine intrusiveness of border search);
Coletta, supra note 35, at 999-1001 (arguing laptop search is nearly as intrusive as
body cavity search).
85. See generally Alzahabi, supra note 38, at 170-76 (analyzing different ap-
proaches taken by various circuits). For further discussion of treating laptops
searches as searches of mere property, see infra notes 108-34 and accompanying
text.
86. See Press Release, Travel Indus. Ass'n, supra note 3 (discussing prolifera-
tion of portable electronic information in travel context).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 507-08 (4th Cir. 2005) (af-
firming defendant's conviction of transportation of child pornography at border).
88. See, e.g., Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1006 (arguing search of laptop required rea-
sonable suspicion because distinguishable from other containers).
89. See Coletta, supra note 35, at 994-95 (describing conflicting rulings of
three lower federal courts).
90. See United States v. Bunty, 617 F. Supp. 2d 359, 365 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (not-
ing that "the Supreme Court has not addressed specifically the search of computer
equipment at the border").
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puter hard drive and computer disks.9 1 Border agents conducted a brief
inspection of Ickes's vehicle, which uncovered a video camera with a tape
that "focused excessively on a young ball boy."9 2 Subsequently, the agent
subjected Ickes to an additional, more thorough search of his vehicle.9 3
The agents discovered marijuana seeds, drug paraphernalia, a Virginia
warrant for Ickes's arrest, and a photo album of nude prepubescent
boys.94 The agents arrested Ickes and subsequently searched the remain-
ing items in his vehicle, including his computer and computer disks.95
The computer and disks contained additional child pornography. 9 6 At
trial, Ickes moved to suppress the contents of the computer, arguing that
the warrantless search violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights. 9 7
The district court denied Ickes's motion, and Ickes was subsequently con-
victed of transporting child pornography. 98
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit specifically rejected Ickes's Fourth
Amendment argument that Congress did not authorize the search of his
computer and disks.99 The court interpreted the relevant statute authoriz-
ing the search and concluded that the statute should be interpreted ex-
pansively to permit searches of computers.1 0 0 Applying the statute, the
court firmly characterized the computer as "cargo," which the statute per-
91. See Ickes, 393 F.3d at 502 (noting factual background of case). Ickes ar-
rived at the Ambassador Bridge port of entry near Detroit, Michigan. See id. at 502
(discussing facts of case).
92. See id. (noting factual background of case). The Court noted this tape led
the border agent to request the help of other agents and subject Ickes's vehicle to
a more thorough search. See id. (discussing facts that led to further search of
Ickes's vehicle).
93. See id. (describing search of Ickes's vehicle).
94. See id. at 503 (enumerating results of border search of Ickes's vehicle).
95. See id. (describing actions taken by border agents following search). The
agents discovered approximately seventy-five computer disks containing more
child pornography. See id. (listing contents of computer disks).
96. See id. (noting that "one of the disks ultimately revealed a home-movie of
Ickes fondling the genitals of two young children").
97. See id. (stating Ickes's arguments to suppress evidence resulting from bor-
der search). The district court held that the search fell under the border search
doctrine and was permissible. See id. (noting district court's ruling on Ickes's mo-
tion to suppress evidence).
98. See id. (stating Ickes's conviction at trial). The court convicted Ickes of
violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (1), transporting child pornography, and sentenced
him to 130 months of imprisonment. See id. (discussing Ickes's specific
convictions).
99. See id. at 503-04 (noting "sweeping" language of authorizing statute).
100. See id. at 504 (analyzing relevant statute in liberal manner to permit
searches of computers). For further discussion of the customs statute, see supra
notes 61-62 and accompanying text. The court rejected Ickes's argument that be-
cause the statute did not expressly enumerate computer equipment, it cannot be
searched pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a). See id. (interpreting statute broadly).
Specifically, the court determined the repeated use of the word "any" in the statute
made it "unreasonable to construe the list restrictively." See id. (explaining justifi-
cations to interpret statute broadly).
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mits to be searched. 10 1 Finally, the court recognized the importance of
the border search exception and concluded the search was reasonable.
10 2
Moreover, the court declined to accept Ickes's contention that even if
the search were permitted under the statute, the search was unconstitu-
tional because it involved the search of expressive material, and therefore
violated both his First and Fourth Amendment rights. 10 3 Specifically,
Ickes argued that border agents should not be permitted to search expres-
sive material without probable cause. 10 4 The court rejected Ickes's argu-
ment primarily because of the adverse practical implications such an
exception would have on border agents. 10 5 Effectively, border agents
would be required to determine if the object to be searched is expressive
material, whether a First Amendment exemption applies, and then deter-
101. See id. ("[I]t is undisputed that Ickes's computer and disks were being
transported by his vehicle. We are unpersuaded that these particular transported
goods are somehow exempt from the ordinary definition of 'cargo."').
102. See id. at 505 ("We construe § 1581 (a) against the back-drop of an 'im-
pressive historical pedigree of the Government's power and interest' at the bor-
der." (quoting United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153 (2004))).
103. See id. at 506 (arguing that First Amendment prohibits searches of ex-
pressive material pursuant to border search exception).
104. See id. at 506-07 (suggesting that First Amendment exception would pro-
tect privacy interest of individuals at border). The court declared that "[f]ollowing
Ickes's logic would create a sanctuary at the border for all expressive material-
even for terrorist plans. This would undermine the compelling reasons that lie at
the very heart of the border search doctrine." Id. at 506.
105. See id. (noting practical improbability of enforcement of Ickes's pro-
posed First Amendment exception). Ickes also contended that United States v. Ram-
sey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977), permitted a higher standard of protection at the border
for expressive material. See Ickes, 393 F.3d at 507 (declining to adopt First Amend-
ment exception). The pertinent regulations addressed in Ramsey prohibited offi-
cials from reading the content of mail without a warrant. See id. (noting Ramsey
Court's analysis and facts of case). In Ramsey, the Court declined to address
whether the First Amendment affords protection for expressive materials at the
border. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 624 (declining to discuss applicability of First
Amendment to case). Further, the Ickes court recognized it was unlikely that the
Supreme Court would agree with Ickes given its decision in New York v. P.J. Video,
475 U.S. 868 (1986). See Ickes, 393 F.3d at 507 (declining to create First Amend-
ment exception). In P.J. Video, the Court held an application for a warrant should
be reviewed under the normal probable cause standard regardless of the fact that
the object of the search was arguably expressive material protected by the First
Amendment. See P.J. Video, 475 U.S. at 874 (holding irrelevant that item sought to
be searched may be expressive material for Fourth Amendment purposes).
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mine if probable cause exists. 10 6 As a result, the court declined to adopt a
First Amendment exception and affirmed Ickes's conviction. 10 7
2. The Case that Upset the Applecart: United States v. Arnold
On October 2, 2006, the United States District Court for the Central
District of California held, as a matter of first impression in the Ninth
Circuit, that the government cannot search a person's laptop at the bor-
der absent particularized suspicion. 10 8 In July 2005, the defendant,
Michael Timothy Arnold, returned to the United States on an interna-
tional flight from the Philippines. 10 9 After picking up his luggage, Arnold
approached a customs checkpoint.1 10 Following the standard customs
checkpoint, the CBP agent selected Arnold for an additional screening.I11
106. See Ickes, 393 F.3d at 506 (hypothesizing practical requirements of Ickes's
First Amendment exception to border search exception). In the court's view, bor-
der agents would be "divert[ed]" from their primary task, which is to protect the
nation's borders. See id. (noting difficulties limitations on border search would
create). The court rejected Ickes's argument-that without his First Amendment
exception every traveler would be subject to a laptop search-because "[c]ustoms
agents have neither the time nor the resources to search the contents of every
computer." See id. at 507 (rejecting Ickes's argument on appeal).
107. See id. at 507-08 (rejecting Ickes's claims and affirming his 130 month
imprisonment).
108. See United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1003 (C.D. Cal. 2006)
(holding that border search of laptop is non-routine search that implicates per-
sonal privacy interests and requires reasonable suspicion), rev'd, 533 F.3d 1003
(9th Cir. 2008). "[H]ighly intrusive searches of persons implicate dignity and pri-
vacy interests. Likewise, opening and viewing confidential computer files impli-
cates dignity and privacy interests." Id. (citation omitted). But see Alzahabi, supra
note 38, at 174 (suggesting Arnold correctly concluded that reasonable suspicion
requirement for border search of laptop is appropriate); Coletta, supra note 35, at
992 (arguing district court's ruling was not reversal but extension of border search
exception jurisprudence). "While Arnold was the first case to find a traveler's pri-
vacy interests implicated in a laptop search, this may be because the trend of carry-
ing laptops while traveling has only recently become widespread." Alzahabi, supra
note 38, at 179 (emphasizing novelty of district court's decision).
109. See Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 999 (reciting background facts); see also
Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1005 (discussing facts of case). On July 17, 2005, Michael
Timothy Arnold arrived at Los Angeles International Airport following a twenty-
two hour flight. See id. (noting Arnold's flight length). The district court de-
scribed Arnold, noting he wore clean, casual clothes, and was cleanly groomed
with a goatee. See id. (describing Arnold's appearance). But see Government's
Opening Brief, United States v. Arnold, 523 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 2:05-CR-
007772), 2007 WL 1407234, at *4 (noting CBP agents described Arnold as "ner-
vous" and "fidgety").
110. See Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 999, 1001 (enumerating facts of border
search). CBP Agent Laura Peng was the first agent to see Arnold and instigate the
additional search. See id. (noting fact of case).
111. See id. (describing border search). But see Government's Opening Brief,
supra note 109, at *4 (depicting Arnold as suspicious). "[CBP Agent Peng] se-
lected [Arnold] for inspection because he was a single male traveling alone who,
according to [CBP Agent] Peng, appeared 'nervous' and 'fidgety,' and 'kept look-
ing around.' In her experience, [CBP Agent] Peng had encountered numerous
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During the screening, the agent questioned Arnold about his travels
and requested that Arnold boot up his laptop.' 12 Upon the laptop's start-
up, the agent inspected the computer's folders entitled "Kodak Pictures"
and "Kodak Memories.""' 3 The subsequent search allegedly revealed a
photograph of two nude-and potentially underage-women. 114 The
agents called special agents with the Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment agency (ICE) to question, investigate, and detain Arnold for several
hours.' 15 ICE permitted Arnold to leave but kept Arnold's laptop and
accessories after discovering more photographs of alleged child pornogra-
single male travelers returning from Asia on trips involving sexual activity." Id. at
*34 (citations omitted).
112. See Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1001 (addressing when CBP Agent Peng
first approached Arnold). CBP Agent Peng asked "Arnold where he had traveled,
the purpose of his travel, and the length of his trip. Arnold stated that he had
been on vacation for three weeks visiting friends in the Philippines." Id.; see also
Government's Opening Brief, supra note 109, at *4 (describing observations of
CBP Agent Peng). The Government provided the following more detailed ac-
count of the instant border search:
Officer Peng asked to see [Arnold's] passport and custom's declaration
and followed up with standard customs questions about the location, pur-
pose and length of his trip. According to Peng, [Arnold] appeared ner-
vous during questioning and his answers struck her as evasive. For
instance, [Arnold] said that he had been visiting friends in Manila, but
did not volunteer much detail about those friends. When asked ques-
tions about his employment, [Arnold] reportedly replied that he was un-
employed but had worked as a math teacher and a night auditor;
according to Peng, however, he could not recall the name of the com-
pany where he worked as a night auditor. Peng therefore decided to
search [Arnold's] baggage.
Government's Opening Brief, supra note 109, at *4 (citations omitted).
113. See Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1001 (noting search of Arnold's laptop).
Arnold attempted to enter the United States with his laptop, an external hard
drive, a USB drive (commonly referred to as "flash drive"), and six compact discs.
See id. (listing objects ultimately searched). While Arnold's laptop booted up, CBP
Agent Peng enlisted the help of CBP AgentJohn Roberts to continue the search of
the laptop while Agent Peng continued the search of Arnold's remaining luggage.
See id. (discussing border search); Government's Opening Brief, supra note 109, at
*5 (describing search of Arnold's property). On the laptop's desktop Arnold
placed personal photographs. See Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1001 (describing in-
formation on Arnold's laptop). According to the government, the pictures de-
picted "[Arnold] engaged in sexual activity with what appeared to be young
Filipino women not obviously of legal age. When asked if the women depicted
were minors, [Arnold] claimed that they were of 'legal age.'" See Government's
Opening Brief, supra note 109, at *5 (describing pictures on Arnold's laptop).
114. See Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1001 (noting search of Arnold's laptop).
When the agents discovered the photographs of the nude, possibly underage wo-
men, they notified Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to continue the
investigation. See id. (discussing request for additional help to search laptop).
115. See id. (recounting ICE's investigation of Arnold). ICE detained Arnold
and his belongings for several hours and continued their search of Arnold's laptop
for child pornography. See id. (describing detention of Arnold's laptop). A subse-
quent search of Arnold's person revealed a flash drive containing more alleged
child pornography. See Government's Opening Brief, supra note 109, at *6 (argu-
ing Arnold carried child pornography).
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phy. 11 6 Agents subsequently obtained a search warrant for Arnold's com-
puter and arrested Arnold."I 7 Before trial, Arnold moved to suppress the
evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant for his laptop at the initial
detention.1 18
The district court addressed whether a border search of a laptop and
its electronic contents qualifies under the border search exception, ren-
dering a finding of particularized suspicion unnecessary. 119 Beginning
with a Fourth Amendment analysis, the court acknowledged that the gov-
ernment's interest at the international border is higher than other places
within the country. 120 Nevertheless, the court noted that a border search
116. See Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1001 (recounting ICE's investigation of
Arnold).
117. See id. (noting detention of Arnold and his subsequent arrest and court
proceedings). Two weeks after the initial detention, federal agents obtained a
search warrant to conduct an extensive search of Arnold's laptop and laptop acces-
sories. See id. (noting government subsequently obtained search warrant). Federal
agents arrested Arnold for the following violations of United States law: transporta-
tion of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a) (1); possession of child pornogra-
phy, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a) (5); and attempting to engage in illicit sexual conduct in
foreign place, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c), (e). See Docket at 2, United States v. Arnold,
454 F. Supp. 2d 999 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (No. 2:05-CR-00772) (listing criminal
offenses).
118. See Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1001 (describing circumstances of motion
to suppress). Arnold filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained from the
search of his laptop at the border. See id. at 1000 (explaining motion to suppress).
Arnold argued that the search of his laptop was similar, for Fourth Amendment
purposes, to an invasive body search because of the private information stored on
his laptop and the vast amounts of information which was stored on his laptop. See
Government's Opening Brief, supra note 109, at *6-7 (discussing Arnold's argu-
ment on appeal). Arnold suggested that the district court should conclude that
the search was non-routine, thus requiring some level of particularized suspicion.
See id. at *9 (addressing Arnold's arguments). On the other hand, the government
argued that the search should be characterized as a routine search, thus not re-
quiring any particularized suspicion. See id. at *7 (suggesting laptops should be
treated as other objects).
119. See Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1000 (noting that validity of border search
of laptop without at least reasonable suspicion is matter of first impression in
Ninth Circuit). DistrictJudge Dean D. Pregerson stated the issue as: "whether the
government can conduct a border search of the private and personal information
stored on a traveler's computer hard drive or electronic storage devices without
Fourth Amendment review." Id. The Government, in its appellate brief to the
Ninth Circuit substantially agreed with Arnold as to the issue of the case: "Whether
the Fourth Amendment requires customs officers at the international border to
have reasonable suspicion to view electronic files stored on computers and similar
storage devices." See Government's Opening Brief, supra note 109, at *1 (stating
issue on appeal).
120. See Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1002 (laying analytical background of bor-
der search exception to general Fourth Amendment warrant requirement). "A
border search is made in the enforcement of customs laws, as distinct from general
law enforcement, and for the purposes of regulating the collection of duties and
preventing the introduction of contraband into the United States." Id. (citing
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)).
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is unreasonable when the need for the search is outweighed by the inva-
sion that the search necessitates.
121
Regarding the instant search, the district court characterized it as
"highly intrusive" because "some may value the sanctity of private thoughts
memorialized on a data storage device above physical privacy." 12 2 The
search revealed private information on a scale unlike that which could be
carried in non-electronic form.123 The court placed substantial emphasis
on both the vast amount of information and the various kinds of docu-
ments potentially stored on electronic devices. 124 To illustrate this point,
the court enumerated the following types of documents it suggested are
frequently contained on laptops: diaries, personal letters, medical infor-
mation, photographs, financial information, confidential attorney-client
information, confidential information obtained by news reporters, and in-
vestors' and corporate executives' trade secrets. 125 Because of these con-
cerns unique to laptops, the district court characterized the search as non-
routine and, consistent with Ninth Circuit border search jurisprudence,
required at least reasonable suspicion to justify the search. 126
To support its conclusion, the district court reasoned that a sliding
scale of intrusiveness was appropriate to determine the permissible scope
of the search.1 27 The court concluded that some level of suspicion is
needed for non-routine border searches of objects, in contrast to routine
border searches of objects such as luggage, wallets, and pockets. 128 Addi-
121. See id. at 1002 (reaffirming limits of border search exception to where
intrusiveness of search outweighs government interest). One example where the
intrusiveness of the search outweighs the government interest to protect the coun-
try's borders is when the government conducts a strip search of a traveler without
particularized suspicion. See id. (discussing border searches where particularized
suspicion is needed to justify search).
122. See id. at 1003 (noting privacy interests in laptop) (emphasis added).
"Indeed, some may value the sanctity of private thoughts memorialized on a data
storage device above physical privacy." Id. Judge Pregerson concluded that infor-
mation stored on laptops and other electronic devices are per se more intrusive
than searches of other objects a traveler may carry. See id. (discussing privacy inter-
ests in property).
123. See id. at 1003-04 (distinguishing borders searches of laptops from other
tangible objects).
124. See id. (describing storage capabilities of laptops).
125. See id. at 1004 (listing possible types of information stored on traveler's
laptop).
126. See id. at 1003-04 (declaring search of laptop more intrusive than search
of other tangible objects and more closely related to non-routine searches of per-
sons). The Court accepted the Ninth Circuit's requirement that non-routine bor-
der searches require at least reasonable suspicion. See id. at 1003 (citing United
States v. Ramos-Saenz, 36 F.3d 59, 61 (9th Cir. 1994)) (noting that in Ninth Cir-
cuit, invasive non-routine searches at border require at least reasonable suspicion).
127. See id. (noting that as intrusiveness of search increases, so does need for
higher degree of suspicion).
128. See id. at 1002-03 (requiring reasonable suspicion); see also United States
v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 2006) (providing examples of routine searches
including searches of outer clothing, luggage, purses, and wallets); Harrell, supra
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tionally, non-routine border searches must be reasonable in scope, and
are reasonable only if it is "no more intrusive than necessary to obtain the
truth respecting the suspicious circumstances."1 29 The court determined
that because the laptop search was both non-routine and invasive, it impli-
cated dignity and privacy interests, thus necessitating a Fourth Amend-
ment analysis. 130 Under such an analysis, reasonable suspicion was
required in Arnold's situation. 13 1
In the decision's final section, the court concluded that the govern-
ment failed to show that reasonable suspicion was present. 132 The court
refused to place significant weight on one of the CBP agent's accounts of
the search because the agent failed to contemporaneously write a memo-
randum, could not accurately remember events or specifics while testify-
ing, and contradicted herself while testifying.' 33 Thus, the district court
held that the government did not have the requisite reasonable suspicion
note 38, at 210 (describing routine searches, including searches of outer clothing,
luggage, purses and wallets, pockets, and shoes). The justification for routine
searches, Harrell argues, is to "allow law enforcement agents to properly patrol the
borders of the United States because agents may prevent citizens and non-citizens
alike from furthering crimes, introducing contraband into the United States, or
threatening national security." Harrell, supra note 38, at 210.
129. See Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1003 (summarizing border search jurispru-
dence). The intrusiveness of a non-routine search must reasonably relate to the
facts that border agents have to conduct the search. See id. (describing scope of
non-routine search). The district court provided the following example: a border
agent conducted a pat-down search of a traveler after observing that the traveler's
eyes were glassy, the traveler looked like he was on drugs, and his story regarding
his trip was unusual. See id. (citing United States v. Vance, 62 F.3d 1152, 1155 (9th
Cir. 1995)) (providing example of border search). Under these circumstances,
mere minimal suspicion was required to conduct a pat-down of the traveler; a
more intrusive search would require a heightened level of suspicion. See id. (not-
ing required level of suspicion for example).
130. See id. (recognizing that non-routine searches implicate dignity and pri-
vacy interests); see also United States v. Flores Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004)
(indicating that highly intrusive searches of person implicate dignity and privacy
interests); Irving, 452 F.3d at 123 (noting that intrusive searches such as strip
searches "substantially infringe" on privacy).
131. See Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1003 (requiring border search to be justi-
fied by reasonable suspicion); see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473
U.S. 531, 54142 (1984) (requiring reasonable suspicion for border searches of
traveler's alimentary canal). But see United States v. Bunty, 617 F. Supp. 2d 359,
364-65 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (concluding reasonable suspicion is not needed where bor-
der search is not highly intrusive).
132. See Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1006-07 (concluding that CBP Agent Peng
did not have "articulable reasonable suspicion" that Arnold carried child
pornography).
133. See id. at 1004-06 (addressing CBP Agent Peng's testimony where she did
not complete written customs report by herself for nearly one year after incident,
Peng's inability to accurately recall facts of search, and disagreeing with Peng's
conclusion that Arnold's answers to questions were suspicious).
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to search the laptop, and, consequently, it granted Arnold's motion to sup-
press the evidence stemming from the search.13 4
3. Removing the Bad Apple from the Cart: The Ninth Circuit Reverses
Following the district court's bold decision altering border search ju-
risprudence, the government appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 135 Judge
O'Scannlain, writing for the circuit court, generally accepted the factual
findings of the district court, including the ultimate finding that Arnold's
laptop contained child pornography. 136 The issue before the Ninth Cir-
cuit was whether border agents may examine a traveler's laptop without
reasonable suspicion.1 37
Arnold supported his position that his motion to suppress should be
affirmed with a three-pronged defense.' 38 First, Arnold contended that
the border search invaded his dignity and privacy interests because his
laptop is different from other closed containers.' 39 Second, Arnold ar-
gued that no court had sufficiently addressed the level of suspicion re-
quired for border searches of laptops and urged the court to adopt a
heightened standard of suspicion. 1 40  Lastly, he claimed that a First
Amendment exception should be created for searches of expressive mater-
ials and that reasonable suspicion is an appropriate level of suspicion for
134. See id. at 1006-07 (holding that border search of Arnold's laptop violated
Fourth Amendment, and granting motion to suppress evidence resulting from ille-
gal search).
135. See United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting
procedural history of case and Arnold's timely appeal from district court opinion
dated October 2, 2006), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009).
136. See id. at 1005 (recounting facts of case, including involvement of CBP
Agent Peng, questioning and detention of Arnold and laptop, and discovery of
pornographic images on laptop).
137. See id. at 1006 (addressing argument of both parties and issues to be
resolved).
138. See Appellee Arnold's Answering Brief at 1-2, United States v. Arnold,
533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-50581), 2007 WL 2195716, at *7.8 (summa-
rizing Arnold's argument on appeal); see also Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1006 (restating
Arnold's arguments on appeal). Additionally, the Ninth Circuit addressed Ar-
nold's other ancillary arguments, including Arnold's assertion that a laptop is "fun-
damentally different from traditional closed containers, and analogized them to
home and the human mind." See id. (noting Arnold's issues on appeal) (quota-
tions omitted). Further, Arnold contended that a First Amendment exception
should be created to require reasonable suspicion when the border search involves
expressive material. See id. (arguing for First Amendment exception).
139. See id. (summarizing core arguments on appeal).
140. See Appellee Arnold's Answering Brief, supra note 138, at *7-8 (asserting
no court has addressed suspicionless border searches of laptops). Arnold also ar-
gued that Hores-Montano does not stand for the principle that non-destructive bor-
der searches of property could be conducted without particularized suspicion for
all property. See id. at *10 (distinguishing Flores-Montano). For further discussion
of Flores-Montano, see supra notes 64-79 and accompanying text.
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border searches of a laptop's contents.1 4 1 Arnold concluded that the bor-
der search of his laptop violated the Fourth Amendment and therefore all
evidence from that search should be suppressed.
14 2
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the basic framework for a border search
analysis and noted the inherent authority of the United States to protect
its borders.' 4 ' The court articulated the Supreme Court's holding in
United States v. Ross,14 4 which held that a traveler's attempt to conceal in-
formation or items in luggage at the border is immaterial because a bor-
der agent may search a traveler's luggage without particularized
suspicion.1 45 Next, the court cited a list of cases where suspicionless
searches of closed containers and their contents have been upheld, includ-
ing the contents of a briefcase. 1 46 Judge O'Scannlain noted that the
framework of limitations to the border search exception focused on
searches of persons.147 For example, some searches of persons, specifi-
cally the search of a person's alimentary canal, require reasonable suspi-
cion. 14 8  Significantly, the court characterized intrusive searches of
property under a different rubric. 149 According to the court, border
searches of property are unlike searches of property within the United
States and may be unreasonable when the search is destructive or con-
ducted in a particularly offensive manner.
150
141. See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1006 (describing Arnold's final argument on
appeal).
142. See id. (arguing motion to suppress evidence should be affirmed on ap-
peal because border agents lacked reasonable suspicion).
143. See id. at 1006-07 (reiterating basic Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
and border search exception to general warrant requirement); see also United
States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153 (2004) (noting heightened federal au-
thority to protect and guard international borders); United States v. Montoya de
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (noting long tradition permitting border
searches without probable cause or warrant).
144. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
145. See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1007 (discussing irrelevance of type of package
carried by travel across international border); see also Ross, 456 U.S. at 823 ("The
luggage carried by a traveler entering the country may be searched at random by a
customs officer; the luggage may be searched no matter how great the traveler's
desire to conceal the contents may be.").
146. See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1007 (enumerating border searches permitted
without particularized suspicion, including: (1) contents of traveler's briefcase and
luggage; (2) traveler's purse, wallet, or pockets; (3) papers found in containers
such as pockets; and (4) pictures, films and other graphic materials) (citations
omitted).
147. See id. (providing established limitations of border searches of persons).
148. See id. (noting Fourth Amendments protects against invasive search of
person's alimentary canal by requiring at least reasonable suspicion).
149. See id. (discussing differences between border searches of persons and
property). The Court held that any routine or non-routine distinctions for
searches of property are inappropriate in light of Flores-Montano. See id. (rejecting
use of routine searches for searches of property).
150. See id. at 1007-08 (acknowledging two instances where border searches of
property may require particularized suspicion). A border search of property that is
destructive or conducted in a particularly offensive manner could require particu-
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The Ninth Circuit attacked the district court's reasoning, emphasiz-
ing that the district court's sliding scale analysis utilizing the level of the
intrusiveness of the property search to determine when reasonable suspi-
cion is required was "erroneous."'15 1 Relying upon Flores-Montano, the
court reiterated that complex balancing tests to determine if reasonable
suspicion is required have no place in border searches of property.
15 2
Further, the court noted that the distinction between routine and non-
routine searches is inapplicable to searches of property, and that the Su-
preme Court had previously rejected an intrusiveness analysis to deter-
mine the requisite level of suspicion, if any, needed to conduct a search
has previously been rejected by the Supreme Court.1 53
Whereas the district court attempted to distinguish Flores-Montano on
the fact that the case involved a search of a vehicle, the Ninth Circuit re-
jected the distinction because Flores-Montano's rationale was based on the
fact that the target of the search was property in general, not the specific
type of property searched.' 54 The court categorically held that any intru-
siveness analysis, or routine/non-routine classification to determine the
reasonableness of property searches conducted pursuant to the border
search exception, is inappropriate.' 55 Thus, the court held that border
searches of property do not need to be justified by particularized
suspicion. 156
larized suspicion. See id. (discussing border searches of property that may be un-
reasonable depending on level of suspicion used to justify search).
151. See id. at 1008 (holding that "[the district court's] reliance on such cases
... to support its use of a sliding intrusiveness scale to determine when reasonable
suspicion is needed to search property at the border is misplaced.") (citation omit-
ted). The district court relied upon United States v. Vance, which analyzed a border
search of a traveler, and held as a search progresses from a "pat-down" to a strip
the level of suspicion must increase accordingly. See United States v. Vance, 62
F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 1995) (determining different levels of suspicion can jus-
tify more intrusive searches of person).
152. See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008 (holding that balancing tests are not appro-
priate method of analysis for border searches of vehicles). "Complex balancing
tests to determine what is a 'routine' search of a vehicle, as opposed to a more
'intrusive' search of a person, have no place in border searches of vehicles." Id.
(quoting United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004)).
153. See id. (discussing inapplicability of intrusiveness analysis in border
searches of property). The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court
rejected the circuit's method of distinguishing between routine and non-routine
searches of property. See United States v. Chaundry, 424 F.3d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir.
2005) (recognizing that Hores-Montano expressly limits characterizations of
searches as routine or non-routine to searches of persons), cert. denied, 547 U.S.
1083 (2006).
154. See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008 (rejecting district court's reasoning); Chaun-
dry, 424 F.3d at 1054 (interpreting Flores-Montano to apply to searches of property
and not narrowly to only searches of vehicles).
155. See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008 (rejecting need for intrusiveness analysis or
routine/non-routine classification).
156. See id. (rejecting "least restrictive means" test for border searches and
holding that routine/non-routine distinction is inapplicable to border searches of
property). The "least restrictive means" test requires the government to use the
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After striking down the application of any intrusiveness analysis, the
court addressed two possible types of property searches which may, none-
theless, require reasonable suspicion: destructive and offensive property
searches. 157 Because Arnold did not raise the issue of whether the search
was destructive, the Ninth Circuit chose not to address the issue. 158 Ar-
nold, nevertheless, argued that the CBP agents conducted the search in a
particularly offensive manner. 159 The court rejected his argument, noting
that nothing about the search was especially more offensive than other
suspicionless border search of luggage or other personal property. 160
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit avoided creating a circuit split with the
Fourth Circuit by declining to carve out a First Amendment exception to
the border search doctrine that would require a higher level of suspicion
to justify searches of expressive material. 161 The Ninth Circuit, conse-
quently, adopted the Fourth Circuit's reasoning as its own. 162 Thus, the
least restrictive means to conduct a search. See United States v. Cortez-Rocha, 394
F.3d 1115, 1123 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing least restrictive means test with regard
to border search).
157. See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1007 (recognizing circumstances where reasona-
ble suspicion could be required for border searches of property). "We again leave
open the question whether, and under what circumstances, a border search might
be deemed 'unreasonable' because of the particularly offensive manner in which it
is carried out." Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155 n.2 (declining to define particularly
offensive manner of border search). Further, the Supreme Court left open the
possibility that a border search of property may be "so destructive as to require
[particularized suspicion]." See id. at 155-56 (recognizing some border searches of
property may be unreasonable without higher level of suspicion).
158. See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1009 (foregoing analysis of whether border search
of Arnold's laptop was so destructive as to require reasonable suspicion).
159. See id. (noting that Arnold insisted CBP agents conduct search of his
laptop and accompanying computer accessories in particularly offensive manner).
160. See id. (rejecting Arnold's argument concerning allegedly offensive man-
ner in which border search was conducted). Specifically, the court held,
"[w]hatever 'particularly offensive manner' might mean, this search certainly does
not meet that test. Arnold has failed to distinguish how the search of his laptop
and its electronic contents is logically any different from the suspicionless border
searches of travelers' luggage that the Supreme Court and we have allowed." Id.
Also, the court refused to treat Arnold's laptop as a home, and therefore highly
protected, reasoning that the Fourth Amendment does not extend to objects not
capable of functioning as a home. See id. (declining to accept Arnold's argument
that Fourth Amendment protections of homes should be extended to laptops).
The Ninth Circuit noted that Arnold's laptop, unlike a home, was readily mobile,
and Arnold had a lessened expectation of privacy at the international border. See
id. (stating court's reasoning for rejecting Arnold's argument); see also United
States v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1985) (permitting search of vehicle without
warrant). In Carney, the Supreme Court concluded that a mobile home's mobility
and its owner's reduced expectation of privacy in the mobile home account for
lesser Fourth Amendment protection. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 391 (addressing fac-
tors which permitted warrantless search of mobile home).
161. See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1010 (declining to create circuit split with Fourth
Circuit regarding First Amendment exception to border search doctrine).
162. See id. (concurring with Fourth Circuit's resolution of First Amendment
exception issue). "We are persuaded by the analysis of our sister circuit and will
follow the reasoning of Ickes in this case." Id.
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Ninth Circuit concluded that the instant border search was a search of
property, where no property search exception could be found, and a First
Amendment exception should not be created for border searches.16 Ac-
cordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling and denied
Arnold's motion to suppress evidence resulting from the suspicionless bor-
der search of his laptop.
1 64
IV. LAPTOPS: A NEW MEDIUM FOR THE SAME OLD TECHNOLOGY
Laptops are vessels of information and personal thoughts that other-
wise could be found in physical documents. 16 5 In most circumstances,
these personal thoughts and documents are voluntarily placed on the
laptop's hard drive by the user or with the user's permission.' 6 6 Finally,
the amount of information contained in a laptop should not be a disposi-
tive factor in determining whether to analyze such a search as an object
not requiring a finding of particularized suspicion to justify the search.' 67
An object, such as laptop, does not implicate the same dignity and
privacy concerns as a highly intrusive search of a person.' 68 Further, the
nature of the object should not determine whether dignity and privacy
concerns are implicated.' 69 Privacy interests in a particular object, such as
163. See id. (rejecting Arnold's arguments on appeal).
164. See id. (reversing district court's decision to grant Arnold's motion to
suppress evidence obtained pursuant to lawful border search at Los Angeles Inter-
national Airport).
165. See United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1003-04 (C.D. Cal.
2006) (illustrating various kinds of personal, business, and confidential informa-
tion that could be contained on travelers' laptops), rev'd, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir.
2008); Press Release, Travel Indus. Ass'n, supra note 3 (presenting polling data
maintaining common usage of laptops among travelers).
166. See Gilmore, supra note 49, at 784 (noting laptop users put information
on laptops intentionally and some software puts information on hard drive without
user's awareness).
167. See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1010 (declining to use quantity of information in
laptop as factor to determine if search is conducted in particularly offensive man-
ner); Gilmore, supra note 49, at 784 (arguing that vast amount of information
capable of being stored on laptops weighs in favor of lower suspicion standards).
168. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) (distin-
guishing reasons to require reasonable suspicion for some border searches of per-
son do not carry over to searches of vehicles crossing international border); United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 540 (1985) (analyzing search of
traveler's alimentary canal and requiring reasonable suspicion where detention
goes beyond scope of routine border search); Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008 (recogniz-
ing distinction between border searches of persons and property); United States v.
Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 2006) (accepting distinctions between routine
searches of property and more intrusive searches of persons); United States v.
Fortna, 796 F.2d 724, 738-39 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting traveler had no expectation
that documents would be kept private from custom agents); cf Arnold, 454 F. Supp.
2d at 1002-03 (declining to hold distinction between searches of persons and prop-
erty at border).
169. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (distinguishing border searches of per-
son and searches of vehicles); Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008 ("The Supreme Court's
analysis was not based on the unique characteristics of vehicles with respect to
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a car, do not change with the varying subjective beliefs of its owner, unless
it is a subjective belief of privacy that society is ready to accept as reasona-
ble.' 70 Rather, concrete distinctions between border searches of persons
and property must be upheld to provide a practical guide to CBP
agents. 17' Arnold's argument that laptop searches are akin to searches of
the person, and therefore should be analyzed as such, would sink CBP
agents into a legal quagmire without a clear set of guidelines of how to
inspect, investigate, and search international travelers. 172 Moreover, the
district court's adoption of Arnold's assertion that laptops should not be
characterized as ordinary objects flies in the face of recent decisions.' 73
Ultimately, a laptop is no more than a digital version of previously
invented ideas or objects. 174 For example, like traditional photo albums,
other property, but was based on the fact that a vehicle, as a piece of property,
simply does not implicate the same 'dignity and privacy' concerns as 'highly intru-
sive searches of the person."' (quoting Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152)); Gilmore,
supra note 49, at 770-71 ("[D]istinguishing the search of objects from that of peo-
ple is critical to expand CBP's authority to examine laptop computers."). But see
Harrell, supra note 38, at 227-28 (arguing that nature of object should be determi-
native in border search analysis); Nelson, supra note 17, at 137, 141-42 (arguing
that laptops, though objects, implicate dignity and privacy interests on par with
physical intrusions).
170. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982) (maintaining that
traveler with toothbrush in paper bag has same protections from intrusion as exec-
utive with locked attach6). Thus, a search pursuant to the border search doctrine
would treat the paper bag and locked attach6 equally despite the executive's
greater desire to conceal materials from the public view; both are subject to search
absent particularized suspicion. See id. at 822-23 (suggesting Fourth Amendment
protects every container that conceals contents from plain view from searches, but
protection varies in different settings, such as at international borders where
search can be conducted at random).
171. See generally United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506-07 (4th Cir. 2005)
(suggesting creation of complicated First Amendment exception for border
searches would "divert customs officials from their charge of policing our borders
and protecting our country"). Further, the Ickes court rejected Ickes's argument
that without a First Amendment exception, all laptops would be subject to search
because customs agents do not have the resources to conduct such searches of
every laptop. See id. (refusing to create First Amendment exception); see also Gov-
ernment's Opening Brief, supra note 109, at *46-51 (arguing laptops searches with-
out particularized suspicion is necessary to protect national security interests).
172. See Ickes, 393 F.3d at 506 (recognizing that creating a heightened stan-
dard to conduct border search would "create a sanctuary at the border... [that]
would undermine the compelling reasons that lie at the very heart of the border
search doctrine"); United States v. Cortez-Rocha, 394 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir.
2005) (fearing that reasonable suspicion requirement at border to search inside
spare tire would "remove the significant deterrent effect of suspicionless searches"
and could entice criminals to use spare tire to smuggle contraband).
173. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152-53 (avoiding balancing tests for border
searches of property in light of heightened government interest); Ickes, 393 F.3d at
506 (recognizing Flores-Montano Court's refusal to encumber border searches of
property with additional intrusion tests and not convey special status to laptops).
174. See United State v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1003-04 (C.D. Cal. 2006)
(listing various kinds of information that could be on laptop which already exist in
non-digital format: diaries, letters, photos, and financial records), rev'd, 533 F.3d
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laptops may contain personal pictures. 1 75 Like date books, laptops may
contain letters and calendars with scheduled appointments. 176 Like hand-
written diaries, laptops may contain a record of one's thoughts and feel-
ings. 177 Finally, laptops contain web browsing histories of their users; this
browsing information could often be discovered in print. 178 For example,
a person may have a copy of The New York Times in his or her briefcase or
carry receipts from retail stores.1 79 One commentator has contended that
a laptop presents new and novel information; however, this argument is
misleading. 180 A laptop is simply a new medium through which old ideas,
information, habits, and practices are used and recorded.1 8 1
Even if, as some commentators argue, a laptop warrants a greater pri-
vacy interest than other objects, that argument belies the fact it is the indi-
vidual user who makes the laptop personal.' 82 One commentator notes
that a laptop, even when purchased by an employer, may become very
personal and private, but only after the user places his or her photos,
1003 (9th Cir. 2008); Coletta, supra note 35, at 988-89 (conceding laptops are dif-
ferent only with regard to quantity of information that can be stored on hard
drive); Gilmore, supra note 49, at 781 (noting laptops are unique because of quan-
tity and nature of information they contain). But see Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth
Amendment Aspects of Computer Searches and Seizures: A Perspective and a Primer, 75
Miss. L.J. 193, 204 (2005) (suggesting quantity and varied types of material make it
"fundamentally different form of writing").
175. See Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1003-04 (listing various kinds of informa-
tion that could be on laptop).
176. See id. (enumerating items contained on laptop).
177. See id. (listing items stored on laptop).
178. See id. (same).
179. See id. (same).
180. See, e.g., Alzahabi, supra note 38, at 178-79 (suggesting combination of
quantity and personal information on a laptop creates an object with privacy inter-
ests). "Before the advent of the laptop computer, it is unlikely that one would
travel carrying all of his or her intimate letters, confidential financial information,
and all of his or her family albums." Id. at 179.
181. See Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1003-04 (illustrating various types of per-
sonal information on laptops including diaries, financial records, photos, among
others). For further discussion of laptop usage, see supra note 165 and accompa-
nying text.
182. See Alzahabi, supra note 38, at 179-80 (suggesting difficulty of leaving sen-
sitive information off computer when traveling). The commentator argues:
Thus, while papers are sometimes searched during a routine border
search, a laptop search is very different. One can easily control which
papers he or she carries in a purse or pocket, but it is not possible to do
the same when it comes to a laptop, which may contain an immense
amount of information.
Id.; see also William B. Baker, U.S. Border Security Policy on Laptop Inspections
Puts Trade Secrets at Risk (Sept. 2008), http://www.wileyrein.com/publication.
cfm?pf=1&publicationid=13828 (noting use of laptops with employers and possi-
bility many different kinds of business documents may be lost); Nicole Ozer, The
Privacy of YourLaptop at International Borders, ByrEs AND PIECES, May 22, 2008, http:/
/www.aclunc.org/issues/technology/blog/the-privacy-ofyour -laptop-at inter-
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notes, and other thoughts on the hard drive. 183 While many travelers'
laptops carry memorialized thoughts, the operator voluntarily places such
information on the laptop. 184 Therefore, international travelers know-
ingly place information on their laptops that could be searched by border
agents. 185 Moreover, travelers with laptops freely cross international bor-
ders; all international travelers should be on notice that some searches
may be conducted by CBP agents. 18 6 Accordingly, in the border search
context, courts should analyze a laptop as an object, subject only to the
two exceptions laid out by the Flores-Montano Court, i.e., those searches
that are destructive of and particularly offensive to property. 18 7
Additionally, the amount of private information contained on or in
the property subject to search is irrelevant to the border search excep-
tion.188 Since the nation's founding, border agents have had the author-
183. See Alzahabi, supra note 38, at 179-80 (describing process by which per-
son may obtain impersonal laptop and create by usage private storage container of
memorialized thoughts); see also Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1003-04 (implying infor-
mation stored on laptops are voluntarily placed on hard drive). The Arnold court
listed information that could be contained on a laptop and implicitly acknowl-
edged that the user controls what is placed on the hard drive. See Arnold, 454 F.
Supp. 2d at 1003-04 (listing various information stored on laptops). The court
stated:
A laptop and its storage devices have the potential to contain vast
amounts of information. People keep all types of personal information
on computers, including diaries, personal letters, medical information,
photos and financial records. Attorneys' computers may contain confi-
dential client information. Reporters' computers may contain informa-
tion about confidential sources or story leads. Inventors' and corporate
executives' computers may contain trade secrets.
Id.
184. See Gilmore, supra note 49, at 784 (addressing laptop's ability to store
information intentionally gathered by user). "In addition to information intention-
ally downloaded or entered onto the device by the user, many operating systems
and programs store information about how and when the device has been used,
including information about the user's interest, habits, and online activity-all of
this unknown to the user himself." Id. (emphasis added).
185. See id. (noting computer programs store information on user's habits).
186. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (holding that gov-
ernment's power to search persons and property at border without probable cause
existed even before adoption of Fourth Amendment); United States v. Thirty-
Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971) (recognizing long tradition of bor-
der searches of persons and property).
187. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) (rejecting
other analyses which attempt to determine intrusive search of property by looking
at tests for intrusive searches of persons); United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003,
1008 (9th Cir. 2008) (treating border search of property without intrusiveness test
for border search of persons), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009); Gilmore, supra
note 49, at 795-96 (advocating laptops and other electronic devices be subjected to
searches without requirement of reasonable suspicion).
188. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1981) (declining to cre-
ate rule whereby personal nature of object affords object greater or lesser Fourth
Amendment protection), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798 (1982); Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1010 (finding storage capacity of laptop does not
make manner of border search particularly offensive); Gilmore, supra note 49, at
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ity to inspect and search large sailing vessels from foreign ports containing
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of objects. 18 9 Recent border search doc-
trine jurisprudence does not address the amount of information subject to
search as a particularly key focus for a border search analysis. I 90 As the
Ninth Circuit aptly opined, "the defendant] has failed to distinguish how
the search of his laptop and its electronic contents is logically any different
from the suspicionless searches of travelers' luggage." 19 1 Instead, the
proper focus of a border search analysis should be the dignity and privacy
concerns implicated by the search, and although such concerns justify re-
quiring particularized suspicion in order to conduct searches of persons,
the same justification does not extend to searches of property. 19 2
V. IMPACT AND FUTURE STEPS: PROTECTING OUR ELECTRONIC
THOUGHTS AND OUR SAFETY
While commentators and courts continue to address the proper ana-
lytical framework, the ultimate issue of how a court characterizes a laptop
will generally determine the result in a given case. 193 Despite the cutting
edge features and mobility that a laptop offers its users, substantial na-
tional security interests are prevalent at the international border.' 9 4 Thus,
although some protections are necessary to alleviate concerns regarding
loss of privacy, Americans should expect the government to conduct bor-
der searches in pursuit of enforcement of federal law.
19 5
783-84 (concluding large quantity of information that could be stored on laptops
provides additional reason to uphold border search doctrine).
189. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 592 (1983) ("In a
lineal ancestor to the statute at issue here the First Congress clearly authorized the
suspicionless boarding of vessels, reflecting its view that such boardings are not
contrary to the Fourth Amendment."). See generally Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618-19
(describing custom officials' powers before and after Fourth Amendment). For
further discussion of the first customs statute, see supra note 34 and accompanying
text.
190. See, e.g., Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1009 (declining to attribute quantity of infor-
mation possibly stored on laptop as determinative of whether manner of border
search is particularly offensive).
191. Id. at 1009 (failing to find distinction between searches of laptops and
other property at border).
192. See, e.g., Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (holding that dignity and privacy
interests of person are reasons for some level of suspicion for border searches of
persons and should not be extended to property).
193. See Coletta, supra note 35, at 999-1000 (discussing various characteriza-
tions of laptops courts may adopt such as akin to invasive search of person, search
of wallet, or something in between).
194. See Flores Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (declaring "[g]overnment's interest in
preventing the entry of unwanted person and effects is at its zenith at the interna-
tional border"); Gilmore, supra note 49 at 787-88 (discussing use of electronic
equipment such as laptops by Islamic terrorists in attack of United States).
195. See Policy Regarding Border Search of Information, supra note 4 (listing
procedures for border search). For further discussion of remedial measures taken
by the government to protect privacy, see infra note 207 and accompanying text.
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In addition to the impracticalities that would occur if laptops were
given a novel and unique status unlike other objects crossing the interna-
tional border, strong national security interests are another reason why
particularized suspicion for searches of laptops should not be required. 196
Child pornography and terroristic plans are a serious threat to the na-
tion. 19 7 Over 500 million people enter or exit the United States every
year.' 98 A small percentage of those entering the United States will bring
contraband and other documents and information on their laptops in at-
tempts to harm citizens. 19 9 Given the strong historical roots of the border
search doctrine and the need to prevent laptops containing dangerous
materials from entering the United States, the ability to search without
particularized suspicion is paramount. 20 0
The district court in Arnold reasoned that the widespread use of the
internet makes it unlikely such contraband would be carried across the
border.20 1 The court implied that because the contraband could be sent
196. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152-53 (recognizing government's interest
to protect nation from unwanted persons and property is at its "zenith" at border);
United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting national security
interests at border to prevent terrorist communication and documents from enter-
ing nation); Gilmore, supra note 49, at 787-88 (concluding that justification of rea-
sonable suspicion would severely hamper policing nation's border putting citizens
at risk from terroristic acts and damaging effects of illegal drug use). But see Al-
zahabi, supra note 38, at 186 ("The government also has a very strong interest in
preventing terrorism; yet, this must be kept within the confines of a reasonable
suspicion to protect the majority of travelers, most of whom are innocent of any
terrorist activities."). The commentator argues the government interest at the bor-
der does not exceed the traveler's interest in a laptop because the material on the
laptop could enter the United States-via the internet-regardless of the traveler
crossing an international border. See id. (noting criminal uses of internet should
increase expectation of privacy at international border).
197. See Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: Critical Infra-
structure and Homeland Security Protection Accomplishments (Sept. 5, 2008),
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1220878057557.shtm (noting extensive
efforts U.S. Government established to combat modem terrorism, including finan-
cial resources expended to protect nation); ICE, Child Exploitation Crimes, http:/
/www.ice.gov/pi/childexploitation/index.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2008) (estimat-
ing millions of children fall victim to sexual predators such as child pornographers
each year).
198. See United States v. Cortez-Rocha, 394 F.3d 1115, 1123 (9th Cir. 2005)
(estimating 330 million of 500 million travelers crossing U.S. border not U.S.
citizens).
199. See, e.g., Alzahabi, supra note 38, at 186 (stating that clearly not everyone
crossing border carries contraband).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537
(1985) (holding that government has strong interest to protect nation from con-
traband since its inception).
201. See United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 2006)
(discussing how contraband can enter United States via internet, which weakens
argument against requiring reasonable suspicion), rev'd, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir.
2008).
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via the internet, the government's interest at the border is lessened.20 2 In
reality, border agents have discovered child pornography on laptops even
though the alleged offenders could have sent the files via the internet.20-3
In recognition of this continuing threat, CBP agents should be permitted
to search without particularized suspicion subject to the judicially estab-
lished exceptions for destructive and particularly offensive searches. 20 4
But where laptops will be searched without particularized suspicion,
some safeguards are necessary to protect privileged information and trade
secrets. 20 5 In particular, the protection of the attorney-client privilege is
crucial to providing an effective and candid attorney-client relation-
ship.20 6 Thus, when documents are searched and copied, the government
has promulgated regulations to ensure the destruction of those docu-
ments when an active investigation has ended.20 7
Despite this protection by the government, business travelers may be
forced to take additional steps to ensure confidentiality of business and
202. See id. ("In our information age, such contraband can flow with the click
of a mouse through the Internet."); Alzahabi, supra note 38, at 175 (concluding
government interest at border is decreased by possibility of sending information
electronically to inside United States).
203. See United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 502 (4th Cir. 2005) (involving
search of laptop containing numerous images of child pornography); see also
United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008) (involving search of
laptop allegedly containing child pornography), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009);
United States v. Bunty, 617 F. Supp. 2d 359, 364-65 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (addressing
motion to suppress following discovery of child pornography on defendant's
laptop at Philadelphia International Airport).
204. See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1010 (holding border search was lawful despite
lack of reasonable suspicion); Gilmore, supra note 49, at 787-88 (concluding bor-
der agents should be permitted to search contents of laptops without particular-
ized suspicion); Policy Regarding Border Search of Information, supra note 4
(declaring that agents are permitted to search persons and property without indi-
vidualized suspicion subject to certain limitations).
205. See Gilmore, supra note 49, at 797 (discussing CBP protections of trav-
eler's privacy through policy of destroying any and all copies of documents where
prosecution is not appropriate).
206. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2008) (addressing at-
torney's ethical obligation to keep communications confidential). Justice Rehn-
quist stated:
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential
communications known to the common law. Its purpose is to encourage
full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal ad-
vice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy de-
pends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
207. See Policy Regarding Border Search of Information, supra note 4. ("[I]f
after reviewing the information there is not probable cause to seize it, any copies of
the information must be destroyed."). But see Harrell, supra note 38, at 231 (argu-
ing traveler's should password protect files and hope they are not selected for sus-
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trade secrets.2 0 8 Specifically, one commentator suggests that if it is impos-
sible to allow a CBP agent to view the information, then the information
should be encrypted and sent via the internet to another computer.2 0 9
Such action, however, may raise suspicion, thereby subjecting the traveler
to a more intrusive search.2 10 At least one court has also noted that send-
ing files to a remote computer still leaves fragments of the document on
the hard drive, which the CBP agents could detect.211 CBP agents, how-
ever, are overburdened and the likelihood that an agent would want to
search deleted files is remote and would likely only be conducted after
obtaining a search warrant. 212 Accordingly, business travelers should pre-
pare for the possibility of a search and take steps to ensure confidential or
secret information will not be on the hard drive.2 13
Notwithstanding the efforts of the judiciary, Congress is considering
affirmative action toward requiring border searches of laptops to be justi-
fied by reasonable suspicion.2 14 Specifically, Senator Russell Feingold pro-
posed a bill that limits CBP's authority to search all electronic equipment
unless there is reasonable suspicion. 2 15 In response, CBP asserted in a
statement to the United States Senate that the agency needs to conduct
border searches of laptops in order to enforce over 600 federal laws. 216
208. See Harrell, supra note 38, at 232 (discussing possibility that border
search may disclose trade secrets); see also Baker, supra note 182, at 1 (addressing
disclosure and prevention of business secrets during border search).
209. See Baker, supra note 182, at 4 (suggesting travelers use new laptops when
traveling and access needed documents via internet).
210. See Harrell, supra note 38, at 231 (cautioning that password protecting
documents on laptop may invite additional suspicion of traveler).
211. See United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2006) (describing
recovery of allegedly deleted files of child pornography with advanced forensic
techniques at government's disposal).
212. See United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 507 (4th Cir. 2005) (discussing
practical concerns of border searches of laptops by CBP agents); Gilmore, supra
note 49, at 793-94 (discussing strains reasonable suspicion standard would create
on overtaxed CBP agents). "As a practical matter, computer searches are most
likely to occur where-as here-the traveler's conduct or the presence of other
items in his possession suggest the need to search further." Ickes, 393 F.3d at 507.
213. See Alexandra Marks, U.S. Defends Laptop Searches at the Border, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, July 10, 2008, http://features.csmonitor.com/innovation/
2008/07/10/us-defends-laptop-searches-at-the-border/ (addressing border
searches travelers may encounter on international trips); see also Baker, supra note
182, at 4 (suggesting travelers use new laptops when traveling and access needed
documents via internet).
214. See Travelers' Privacy Protection Act of 2008, S. 3612, 110th Cong.
(2008), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=sl 10-3612
(requiring reasonable suspicion for border searches of electronic devices); see also
Electronic Device Privacy Act of 2008, H.R. 6588, 1 10th Cong. (2008) (prohibiting
border searches of laptops).
215. See Travelers' Privacy Protection Act of 2008, S. 3612, 110th Cong. (2008)
(requiring reasonable suspicion for border searches of electronic devices).
216. See Laptop Searches and Other Violations of Privacy Faced by Americans Re-
turning from Overseas Travel Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and
Property Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary 10th Cong. (2008) (statement of
[Vol. 54: p. 541
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The agency noted that its agents are professionals and often will not con-
duct laptop searches unless facts and circumstances create individualized
suspicion-a standard not required by law.2 17 Finally, the agency re-
marked that laptop searches have proven helpful, protected American citi-
zens, and resulted in many convictions. 2 18
Border agents should continue to conduct suspicionless searches of
laptops at the border. 21 9 National security interests remain high at our
borders to protect U.S. citizens and residents. 220 If Americans are willing
to expose their dirty socks at the airport, they should prepare for searches
of laptops without particularized suspicion. 22 1
Erick Lucadamo
Jayson P. Ahern, Deputy Comm'r, U.S. Customs and Border Prot.), available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/congressionaltest/laptop-searches.
xml (stating that CBP is charged with enforcement of over 600 federal laws and
with sovereign integrity of United States).
217. See id. (describing precautions taken to limit scope of laptop searches
while continuing to fulfill agency's mission).
218. See id. (providing examples of convictions resulting from border search
of laptops).
219. See, e.g., Gilmore, supra note 49, at 797 ("The border search exception to
the Fourth Amendment must be preserved in our increasingly digitized world.").
220. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (stating that
government has strong interest to enforce federal law at international border).
For further discussion of the government's interest at the international border, see
supra notes 32-85 and accompanying text (discussing nation's strong interest in
protecting international borders).
221. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537
(2004) (1985) (reaffirming that routine searches of persons and property do not
need reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant). For further discussion of
routine border searches, see supra notes 32-85 and accompanying text (discussing
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